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Introduction
Since the start of the 21st century, Morocco’s relationship with Europe Union has been
characterized by a desire to increase cooperation in the realms of politics, security, economics,
and culture1. As a state of “Advanced Status” under the European Neighborhood Policy,
Morocco is afforded both economic and political privileges that seek to develop the state and
improve relations between the two actors. Despite this commitment to cooperation, Morocco’s
diplomatic relations with Spain, the only EU member with whom it shares a border, have
suffered from significant crises throughout the 21st century. These crises have subsequently
threatened the neighborly relations established through international agreements between
Morocco and the EU. As issues of sovereignty and the fortification of external borders remain
integral to the foreign policy of the EU, these breaches of goodwill have challenged the
organization’s approach to foreign policy in regard to Morocco. Considering the relative power
of Morocco in comparison to that of the European Union, the escalation of these crises has
brought into question the intentions of the Moroccan government in threatening friendly relations
with its most salient economic and political partner. In this article I determine the motivation
behind the Moroccan government’s foreign policy decisions regarding recent diplomacy with
Spain.
The two cases used in this study span a 19 year period between 2002 and 2021, including
one occurring in the pre-Arab Spring era and another in the post-Arab Spring era. The two cases
I chose to explore in this analysis are the 2002 Perejil Island Crisis and the 2021 Ceuta border
incident. One notable feature of these crises is that the origins of the tensions rise from

1

(Casier Tom. “The European Neighborhood Policy: Assessing the EU’s Policy towards the
Region.” In The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World,
ed. Federiga Bindi (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 100.
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Morocco’s territorial disputes with Spain that have remained consistent in the years since the
Spanish government withdrew from Morocco as a colonial power. Despite the decolonization
and subsequent withdrawal of Spanish governmental control, Spain has continued to maintain
the validity over its claim of the six coastal territories of Ceuta, Melilla, Vélez de la Gomera,
Alhucemas, the Chafarinas Islands, and Perejil Island, which Morocco has claimed since
achieving independence in 19562. Despite Morocco’s predominantly friendly relations with
members of the European Union, the Spanish possession of these territories has historically
ignited diplomatic crises between the two actors. Although the Spanish and Moroccan
governments remain committed to strong partnership in combating terrorism, organized crime,
human-trafficking, and drug smuggling, paltry disagreements regarding these territories remain
persistent3. Seldom do these tensions escalate into serious crises due to the auspiciousness of this
partnership. Despite this, the 2002 Perejil Island Crisis and the 2021 Ceuta border incident have
served to hinder the neighborliness between the two states and call into question the intentions
behind the Moroccan government’s foreign policy decisions regarding its shared border with the
European Union.
The comparability of these cases lie in their origins, as both crises stem from decisions by
the Moroccan government to suspend diplomatic relations with Spain in response to what was
viewed by Rabat as Spanish failures to respect Moroccan sovereignty and security. The two
cases resulted in varying levels of diplomatic conflict and condemnation from the European
Union. Both crises occurred during a period in which Morocco and the EU were politically and

2

Trinidad, Jaime. “An Evaluation of Morocco’s Claims to Spain’s Remaining Territories in
Africa.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 61, no. 4 (2012): 961-964.
3
Ana María López Sala. 2012. Donde El Sur Confluye Con El Norte: Movimientos Migratorios,
Dinámica Económica Y Seguridad En Las Relaciones Bilaterales Entre España Y
Marruecos Fundación CIDOB: 3-4.
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economically committed to peace, and for this reason, notably deviated from the expectations of
both the European Union Association Agreement and the European Neighborhood Policy
objectives outlined for Morocco. In my analysis I chose one case from the period prior to the
Arab Spring and one case from the years following the Arab Spring due to the shifting political
dynamics of the Moroccan state within the past two decades. Although the Moroccan
government has “ensured its continuity as a stable executive monarchy” through the successful
portrayal of the King “as a proponent of change” during the Arab Spring, there remains an
overarching desire for reform among the Arab Spring organizers who were unsatisfied with
extent of political reforms made by the government 4. Therefore, the inclusion of both a pre-Arab
Spring case and post-Arab spring case will address the political climate of Morocco during both
periods and inform the analysis of potential explanations of the Moroccan government’s
behavior during these different crises.
In analyzing these case studies I determine two potential explanations for the Moroccan
government’s foreign policy decisions regarding diplomatic conflict in Spain. The first
explanation I explore is the potential of securing concessions from the European Union and the
international community regarding their position on the Western Sahara conflict. In this paper I
hypothesize that Morocco uses its territorial disputes with Spain to foster support for its claim of
sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Explanations from Rabat following decisions made during
these diplomatic crises suggest that Spanish positions regarding the Western Sahara conflict
heavily influence the escalation of these conflicts. Within the analysis I look at the lasting
political and economic outcomes of these crises as they relate to the relationship between

4

Rivetti, Paola. 2015. "Continuity and Change before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt
and Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policymaking in North Africa." British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies 42 (1): 8.
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Morocco and the EU. In this article I determine the extent to which this hypothesis is accurate
and indicate the specific results of Morocco’s foreign policy decisions regarding the European
Union during these periods.
The second motivation I examine is an attempt at strengthening domestic support for the
Moroccan government. This hypothesis stems from an examination of both pre-Arab spring and
post-Arab spring cases. Morocco’s Arab Spring protests, otherwise known as the February 20th
movement, saw the creation of a new constitution in 2011 to appease protests calling for reform
of the king’s regime. Despite the creation of this constitution aiming to address the concerns over
the Morocco’s widespread “marginalization, poverty, corruption, impunity, lack of
accountability, and subservience of the judiciary to the executive branch”, these reforms were
largely ineffective and were passed more to appease protesters rather than to transform the
political system in actuality5. The political stagnancy in Morocco following 2011 has served to
reinforce the movement’s motivation to enact change. In my analysis of the case studies, I
examine the regime’s support in both the pre-2011 and post-2011 eras, looking specifically at the
extent of support for the Moroccan government’s positions during the two crises by looking at
the support or lack thereof of both opposition parties and civil society organizations. This
examination determines the extent to which the Moroccan government is utilizing these conflicts
as a strategy to garner domestic political support. Within this analysis I examine the role of
nationalism in influencing Moroccan public opinion on the Western Sahara conflict and these
territorial disputes. In comparing these cases I determine whether the ignition of tensions

5

Radi, Abdelaziz. 2017. "Protest Movements and Social Media; Morocco’s February 20
Movement." Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement 42 (2): 33.
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between Morocco and Spain are motivated more by foreign policy objectives or domestic
political considerations.
Case Study Rationale: Diplomatic Tensions in the 21st Century
Due to the extent of escalation and the widespread publicity of both the Perejil Crisis and
the Ceuta border incident, I have chosen these cases to analyze the Moroccan government’s
motivations behind the decision to breach international agreements of neighborliness as outlined
by the European Union. Both cases relate to questions of sovereignty and border security,
therefore constituting significant interests in the realms of both Moroccan international relations
& foreign policy as well as Moroccan national security. These crises also occurred months prior
to the Moroccan general elections of their respective years, therefore playing a role in the
outcomes of said elections. In the examination of these cases I present an explanation of the
international relations and political climates of Morocco prior to the crisis, an explanation of the
escalation of diplomatic tensions, and the outcomes of the crisis. In doing so I highlight the
conditions of the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Spain and potentially elucidate the
motivations behind these political decisions. In determining the period in which to look at
diplomatic tensions between Morocco and the EU, I elected to analyze relations in the 21st
century due to the stability of King Mohammed VI’s regime in particular. The rationale behind
this decision lies in the fact that Moroccan relations with the EU changed significantly following
King Mohammed VI’s ascension to the throne in 1999. Prior diplomatic relations with the EU
were mostly focused on increasing economic cooperation but remained interdependently distant
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due to King Hassan II’s regime being characterized by significant human rights abuses and a
lack of sufficient democratization6.
Considering the significant changes to the Moroccan political atmosphere following the
death King Hassan II and the ascension of his son King Mohammed VI, analyzing cases prior to
the 21st century would not be conducive to understanding the current relations between Morocco
and the European Union. The analysis of these cases includes two potential explanations for the
Moroccan government’s behavior during the respective crises. One explanation focuses on the
consolidation of support for the Moroccan government’s position on Western Sahara’s
sovereignty by the international community. The second hypothesis suggests that the escalation
of these conflicts served to consolidate of domestic political support for the king’s regime in an
attempt to divert from domestic failures by capitalizing on nationalistic sentiment regarding
Morocco’s sovereignty.
Case I: The Perejil Island Crisis (2002)
Parsley Island, otherwise known as Isla Perejil in Spanish or Leila/Tura in
Arabic/Amazigh, is an islet off the coast of Morocco whose sovereignty remains a point of
contention between Spain and Morocco. Although only 0.25 square miles and uninhabited, the
island was the focus of a diplomatic crisis that endured 9 days and involved military action on
both sides of the conflict. Prior to the conflict, the claim of ownership of Parsley Island was
never consistently or explicitly established and therefore remained unoccupied by either state.
While Parsley Island constitutes a territory that is of little economic interest, the Island has been
noted as an strategic geopolitical component due to its proximity to Europe and its perceived

6

Campbell, Patricia J. "Morocco in transition: Overcoming the democratic and human rights
legacy of King Hassan II." African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1 (2003): 42.
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importance in the realms of drug trafficking, migration, and counterterrorism7. Although the tiny
islet was relatively unknown to the populations of both states prior to the crisis, the escalation of
military tensions between Morocco and Spain served to highlight the lingering effects of
European colonialism of Northern Africa. Therefore, the crisis has transformed Parsley Island
into a territory that “has acquired a symbolic value far exceeding its objective importance”,
which may enlighten the importance of the Moroccan government’s decision to provoke tensions
on such a site8.
The precursor to the Perejil Island Crisis between Morocco and Spain lay in a series of
disagreements in both economic and political spheres following the ascension of Mohammed VI
to the Moroccan throne in 1999. While disagreements regarding claims to Spanish territories in
North Africa have remained consistent since the 16th century, the independence of Morocco from
the French in 1956 reignited serious claims to the territories by the Moroccan government. One
integral antecedent to the crisis was the withdrawal of the Moroccan ambassador to Spain on
October 27, 2001 that was the culmination of a series of disagreements between Morocco and the
EU, most notably in regard to:
“1) Problems in negotiating the renewal of the Fisheries Agreement between the
European Union and Morocco so that European fishing vessels (mostly Spanish) could fish in
Moroccan waters; 2) Management of migratory flows and fight against drug trafficking from
Morocco into Europe through Spain; 3) Support of the Spanish media and civil society actors to

7

Frutos, Moira García de. "Perejil, un Conflicto Simbólico por la Información." Revista
Aequitas: Estudios sobre historia, derecho e instituciones 1 (2011): 86.
8
Tams, Christian J. "A Sprig of Parsley That Leaves a Bitter Taste-The Spanish-Moroccan
Dispute about Perejil/Leila." German YB Int'l L. 45 (2002): 270.
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the Sahrawi independence in Western Sahara; 4) and opposition of Spain to the Baker I Plan”9.
This decline in relations, especially in regard to the 2001 Fisheries agreement, solidified the
political tensions necessary to catalyze the escalation of the Perejil Crisis. During the
negotiations for these fishing agreements, the Spanish government blamed Morocco for acting
inflexibly and stated “that there would be ‘consequences’ for Morocco as a result of its ‘refusal’
to sign a new agreement”10. The use of this language by the Spanish representatives was
perceived as a threat by the Moroccan government and only served to further heighten the
tensions between the two actors. This tension only increased following Spanish military
maneuvers in the territory of Alhucemas on July 6th 200211. Morocco’s response to the perceived
threat to its territorial unity emerged on the July 11th, 2002 when twelve members of the
Moroccan Gendarmerie seized the island and began flying two Moroccan flags on the rocky
islet.
The occupation of Parsley island by Moroccan forces was discovered by the Spanish
Civil Guard hours later on route to Ceuta, who then approached the islet and were subsequently
challenged by armed members of the Moroccan Gendarmerie and forced to retreat. Following the
occupation of Parsley Island by Moroccan forces, the Spanish government as well as the
European Union condemned the behavior and called on the Moroccan government to withdraw
from the islet on July 11th. Despite this request, the Moroccan government failed to
acknowledge these requests until July 15th. In response, the Moroccan government commented

9

Jordán, Javier. “The Confrontation between Spain and Morocco over the islet of Perejil. A
Reinterpretation from the Countering Hybrid Threats Perspective” Global Strategy –
Universidad de Granada (2018): 2.
10
Gillespie, Richard. "‘This Stupid Little island’: a Neighbourhood Confrontation in the Western
Mediterranean." International Politics 43, no. 1 (2006): 113.
11
Frutos, Moira García de. "Perejil: Un Conflicto Simbólico por la Información.": 86.
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that “the deployment of men on the island was part of a fight against illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, and other illegal activities (a reference to terrorism)” while Moroccan Foreign
Minister Mohamed Benaissa described the occupation as “a simple surveillance operation” that
would benefit both actors in its surveillance of alleged clandestine activities12. Despite this
response, the Spanish government deemed the occupation an act of military aggression and
subsequently decided that military action would indeed be necessary. This perception of the
occupation of Parsley Island as an act of military aggression heightened following the
replacement of the Genderarmerie with six Moroccan marines who erected a “large, solid tent on
the island” and the establishment of “the presence of about a hundred troops in support” on the
mainland of Morocco13.
Following the escalation of Moroccan military presence and the subsequent breakdown in
communication between Moroccan and Spanish diplomats, the Spanish military developed
Operation Romeo-Sierra in order to end the dispute militarily. This counter-operation was
launched on the morning of July 17th by a Special Operations Group within the Spanish military.
The group of twenty-eight Spanish marines landed on the islet with Spanish air and naval
support backing their arrival and the six Moroccan marines “were captured, taken to Ceuta, and
handed back to the Moroccan authorities” once across the border14. After the successful
completion of the operation, Spanish troops remained on Parsley Island in the immediate
aftermath of the conflict. Integral to the end of the crisis was the mediation of the conflict by the
United States. In a statement developed by the state department, the U.S. brokered an agreement

12

Gold, Peter. “Parsley Island and the Intervention of the United States.” Journal of
Transatlantic Studies (Springer Nature) 8, no. 2 (2010): 91.
13
Gold, Peter. “Parsley Island and the Intervention of the United States.”: 92.
14
Ibid., 92-93
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that “involved the withdrawal and absence of all personnel and symbols of sovereignty, a return
to the status quo ante, and plans to discuss improving bilateral relations” between Spain and
Morocco15. Following the adoption of this agreement, Spain withdrew troops from Parsley Island
on July 20th.
Despite the adoption of the agreement officially ending the conflict, the months following
the crisis proved tenuous for the international relationship between the two actors. Formal
diplomatic relations were not restored until January 2003 and the following months proved
precarious for Moroccan-Spanish diplomacy due to the evidently discordant political relationship
fostered by the crisis16. Despite reestablishing diplomatic ties, the following months proved
precarious for Moroccan-Spanish diplomacy as Morocco accused the Spanish government of
“lacking neutrality on the Sahara issue when it chaired the Security Council” in July 2003 and
the Spanish government suspending arms sales to Morocco later that year citing the Perejil Crisis
as their rationale17. Regardless of the tensions between the two states, the de-escalation of the
conflict and subsequent reestablishment of friendly behavior has served to ensure that Spain and
Morocco remained important economic and political partners. Despite the occasional outbreak of
minor diplomatic disputes regarding the Spanish enclaves in North Africa and disagreements
regarding their relative positions in the Mediterranean, a crisis as escalated as that of Parsley
Island has yet to erupt between Spain and Morocco since 2002.

15

Ibid., 95.
Arieff, Alexis. “Morocco: Current Issues” Congressional Research Service. (2011): 10.
17
Ibid., 21.
16
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Foreign Policy Objectives
In examining the extent to which foreign policy objectives played a role in motivating the
Moroccan government’s escalation of the Perejil Island Crisis, an understanding of Morocco’s
position within the international political system of the time is integral. Occurring in 2002, only
three years into King Mohammed VI’s reign, Perejil constituted the King’s first major diplomatic
rift with Europe since his ascension. Considering the EU’s position as both Morocco’s largest
foreign investor and most influential partner, the decision to invade the islet appeared
counterproductive to the aims of the new monarch. Where the importance of the Perejil Island
Crisis is evident is in its relative unimportance as a significant territory. The choice to approve
the invasion of the obscure, uninhabited rock instead of electing any of the other territories
disputed with the Spanish government served to elucidate the fact that the King was potentially
more interested in utilizing the crisis as a platform through which the regime could seek to
resolve issues related to territorial disputes, fishing agreements, and migration.
Where this attempt to win concessions from the European Union appears most evidently
is in the analysis of the Moroccan government’s attitude towards Spanish following the
resolution of the diplomatic crisis. The use of Perejil as an attempt to sway international
sentiments regarding its claim to Western Sahara is reflected in the language used by Moroccan
government officials during the period following crisis in the context of the proposal of the
Baker I plan to the United Nations. The Baker I plan constituted a framework agreement that
proposed the autonomy of the Western Sahara as a territory of the state of Morocco18. The
proposal was approved by the Moroccan government in 2001 and was subsequently presented by

18

Miguel, Carlos Ruiz. "El largo camino jurídico y político hacia el Plan Baker II.¿ Estación de
término?." Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional (2005): 461.
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France, a Moroccan ally, to the EU Foreign Affairs Council, but failed to pass due to Spain’s
objection to its lack of support by the Polisario Front19. This rejection of the proposal frustrated
the Moroccan government, which is reflected in the comments following the Perejil crisis about
Spain’s lack of neutrality on the Western Sahara conflict. The connection the initiation of the
crisis to the Spain’s position on the Western Sahara suggests the motivation of the crisis lie in
Morocco’s concern about Spain’s inevitable position as a “non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council between 2003 and 2004” which in turn would make “it even more difficult for
the UN to approve the Baker I plan” for which Morocco had been advocating20. The concern
over the rejection of this plan proved reasonable following the rejection of the plan and its
subsequent demise.
The Perejil Crisis occurred mere days before the King Mohammed VI’s highly publicized
wedding which served as a platform to showcase the Moroccan position on the status of Ceuta an
and Melilla. In the context of such an important Moroccan cultural event, the ignition of the
Perejil crisis under the approval of the King suggests that the conflict was an attempt to
reconfigure the diplomatic spat into a commentary on the Morocco’s sovereignty over its
territories that would inevitably lead towards an understanding of Morocco’s claim to the
Western Sahara. Albeit the outcome of the crisis did little to aid the regime in its cause, it did
reignite nationalist sentiment domestically regarding the legitimacy of Morocco’s claims to
Ceuta and Melilla. The media attention both domestically and internationally also served to
reinvigorate the narrative that pinned Morocco as a state struggling with its territorial unity due
to a persistent presence of the colonial power of Spain. In constructing this narrative, the

19

Jordán, Javier. “The Confrontation between Spain and Morocco over the islet of Perejil. A
Reinterpretation from the Countering Hybrid Threats Perspective”: 3.
20
Ibid.,
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Moroccan media apparatus sought to consolidate international recognition of its grievances and
potentially present the Western Sahara as an integral part of Moroccan territory.
Domestic Political Considerations
Essential in determining the extent of the primacy of domestic politics the Moroccan
regime’s decisions during the Perejil Crisis is an understanding of the political climate of the
period and the challenges facing King Mohammed in the years immediately following his
ascension to the throne. The relative juvenility of King Mohammed VI’s regime in 2002 not only
solidified a need to prove his capabilities on the international stage, but also a need to
consolidate support during a period in which he was being “indirectly challenged by the
increasing strength of the country’s Islamist movement” that questioned the complete authority
of the monarchy21. King Mohammed VI’s agenda upon ascending to the throne was
characterized by his desire to enact social reforms and liberalize the authoritarian government
inherited from his father. This agenda was largely criticized by Islamist opposition parties who
sought to “resist any modern alternative to the existing authoritarian system”, especially in
regard to the King’s commitment to social reforms22.
The lack of experience of the King in comparison with his predecessor fostered a political
climate in which “the monarchy was being questioned (albeit quietly) by sectors of the Islamist
movement”, therefore establishing placing “pressure on the new king to strike popular,
nationalist poses and produce an international ‘success’” that would serve to characterize his

21

Gillespie, Richard. "‘This Stupid Little island’: a Neighbourhood Confrontation in the Western
Mediterranean": 129.
22
Maghraoui, Abdeslam. "Political authority in crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco." Middle East
Report 218 (2001): 12.
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regime as one that would project the national interest of Morocco more broadly23. Having had
little opportunity to act on the international stage, King Mohammed VI’s decision to approve the
invasion of Perejil demonstrated a successful method through which to consolidate support from
the Islamist parties that questioned his legitimacy. The fact that “opposition politicians in the
Moroccan capital Rabat backed the official government explanation that [Parsley Island] has
been Moroccan territory” since achieving independence in 1956 suggests that there was an
overarching consensus on the decision of King Mohammed to invade the islet24. This
demonstration of support can potentially be contributed to a consolidation of Moroccan
nationalism not unlike the “rally ‘round the flag” effect attributed to the United States in times of
international crisis. Although there exists little evidence of Moroccan opposition to the invasion
of Parsley island, this may be attributed to the Moroccan political system which favors parties
and organizations that reflect ideologies and agendas that align with the political interests of the
king.
One potential explanation for the use of the invasion of Parsley Island to consolidate
domestic political support is the occurrence of the crisis mere months before the September 2002
legislative elections in Morocco. This proximity suggests that the Perejil Crisis was “taking place
at a crucial moment of the Moroccan political transition and could become an important factor in
its outcome”, considering its characterization as the first election to occur under King
Mohammed VI’s regime, which had committed itself to free and fair elections following the poor

23

Gillespie, Richard. "‘This Stupid Little island’: a Neighbourhood Confrontation in the Western
Mediterranean": 124.
24
Tremlett, Giles. 2002. “Moroccans seize Parsley Island and leave a bitter taste in Spanish
mouths” The Guardian. July 13.
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reputation of his father’s regime25. Despite this commitment, King Mohammed VI sought to
establish a government in which political parties’ relative power was dependent on its amiability
with the monarch rather than its political agenda. This system ensured that “the distinction
between opposition and loyalist parties became harder to discern, as all parties, by choice or
necessity, inched closer to the monarchy to ensure their political survival” which led to a
discordant relationship between the Moroccan political elite and their electorates. This in turn
caused discontent among the Moroccan population with its government, which “was reflected by
citizens’ general apathy toward the political process, low voter turnout in elections, and mistrust
of politicians”26. Despite the significance of this election and the success of opposition parties in
winning the majority of seats in the legislature, the fact that political system of Morocco
perpetuates the demise of any political party that displays significant opposition to the King
Mohammed VI’s political agenda suggests that the primacy of domestic politics was entirely
secondary to the acquisition of concessions from the European Union regarding the Western
Sahara conflict amongst other territorial pursuits.
Case II: Ceuta Border Incident (2021)
As one of the two Spanish enclaves on the border of Morocco North along with Melilla,
Ceuta and the claim over its territory have consistently served as a point of contention between
Spain and Morocco. Despite being under the jurisdiction of Spain since 1580, the Moroccan
government has continuously “maintained that Ceuta is a ‘usurped city’ under Spanish
occupation” and considered one of “the last colonies in Africa” along with Melilla and the other

25

Vasconçelos, Álvaro de. "Perejil/Leila: Lessons for Europe. Why Have All Failed?." Boletín
Elcano 3 (2002): 3.
26
Fakir, Intissar. "Morocco’s Islamist Party: Redefining politics under pressure." Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2017): 5.
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Spanish territories in the region27. These claims to Ceuta have continuously been a source of
contention between Spain and Morocco despite little international support for Morocco’s
position on the disputed territory considering the self-identification of its residents as Spanish
citizens.
The strategic importance of Ceuta lies in its characterization as an integral territory in
both the mitigation of smuggling and irregular migration into the European Union. One of the
most important aspects of its classification as a territory of Spain is its inclusion in the Schengen
Agreement, under which “30,000 Moroccan day laborers can enter Ceuta each day” therefore
establishing an “informal economy with the movement of contraband across borders”, a fact that
has influenced the EU to fund the construction of an 8.2km double fence around the enclave28.
Further protection of Ceuta’s border by the EU is reliant on “EU funding to both Spain and
Morocco on migration management and border controls/surveillance” in the interest of the
European External Action Service29. Funding this protection typically ensures that the Moroccan
government remains vigilant in managing irregular migration and fulfills its agreement to halt
migrants en route to Europe.
Despite the investment of the European Union in ensuring that Morocco has the capacity
to curb irregular migration to Ceuta, this investment proved futile in a border incident beginning
on May 17, 2021. Although the decade prior to this incident lacked significant diplomatic

27

Trinidad, Jaime. “An Evaluation of Morocco’s Claims to Spain’s Remaining Territories in
Africa.”: 965.
28
White, Gregory W. “Sovereignty and International Labor Migration: The ‘Security Mentality’
in Spanish-Moroccan Relations as an Assertion of Sovereignty.” Review of International
Political Economy 14, no. 4 (2007): 705.
29
Carrera, Sergio, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Nora El Qadim, Mehdi Lahlou, and Leonhard Den
Hertog. "EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A model to
follow?." CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe (2016): 4.
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tensions between Spain and Morocco, U.S. recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the
Western Sahara signaled a deterioration of this period of relative amity. Perceiving the
“persuasive influence of the USA recognizing Moroccan sovereignty” over the Western Sahara
as influential enough to “hold sway with other countries”, the Moroccan regime began to push
for similar recognition from U.S. allies within the European Union30. The refusal of states like
Germany and Spain to immediately align with the U.S. government’s position on the conflict
resulted in strained diplomatic relations between Morocco and the EU.
The Moroccan government’s disillusionment with the lack of consensus from Spain
regarding the conflict then led Morocco to reignite tensions regarding the territorial holdings of
Spain in North Africa. These tensions escalated following the admission of Brahim Ghali, the
president of the Saharawi Polisario Front, to a hospital in Spain in April 2021 for COVID-19
treatment. Perceiving this admission to the Spanish hospital as a provocation due to Morocco’s
consistent “criticism of an alleged friendly Spanish attitude vis-à-vis Saharawi independentists”,
the already tense diplomatic attitudes heightened31. These series of political variances culminated
in “the relaxation of the control mechanisms by the Moroccan security forces located on the
border in Ceuta” on May 17 in which 8,000 people illegally entered the enclave, including 1,500
minors32. The influx of migrants overwhelmed Spanish border control and resulted in the
deployment of the Spanish military to mitigate the influx of migrants.

30

Zamakda Allison, Safwaan. "A Paradigmal Shift in the Recognition of Moroccan Sovereignty
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Following the incident, diplomatic tensions between the two states remained tumultuous,
with both the EU and the Spanish government condemning Morocco for their perceived
weaponized utilization of irregular migration as a form of political coercion. In the month
following the conflict, Morocco withdrew its ambassador to Spain, Karima Benyaich, who, in
response to the crisis, stated that “there are acts that have consequences in relations between
countries”, purportedly in reference to Brahim Ghali’s admission to Spain the month prior33.
Albeit this statement by Benyaich suggested the relaxation of border control was due to the Ghali
incident, the Moroccan government did not confirm that the migratory crisis was a direct
response to the perceived wrongdoing by the Spanish government. Instead, the Moroccan foreign
minister, Naser Burita stated the influx of refugees could be attributed to “fatigue of the
Moroccan police apparatus after the festivities of the end of Ramadan” as well as “the total
inaction of Spanish police” at the time of the breach34.
The Moroccan ambassador to Spain only officially returned to Madrid in March 2022
following an agreement between the Spanish government and Morocco to support Rabat’s
proposal Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the Western Sahara. In a letter to King Mohammed
VI, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez praised the proposal as “the most serious, credible,
and realistic basis for the resolution” of the conflict35. The establishment of friendly relations
between the two nations and the agreement in regard to a stance on the Western Sahara conflict
was attributed to the Spanish desire to “guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Spain” through
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the avoidance of escalated territorial disputes over Spanish territory in North Africa as well as
migration36.
Foreign Policy Objectives
In determining the motivations behind the Moroccan government’s diplomatic behavior,
it is evident that there exists a large extent to which the regime has utilized the Ceuta Border
incident as a method through which to gain international concessions. Despite Morocco’s
“advanced status” under the European Neighbourhood Policy affording the country large
amounts of aid from the EU for border management, the Moroccan government has utilized
Europe’s anxiety over migration following the 2015 refugee crisis as a tool of political leverage.
A large source of this anxiety stems from the lack of consensus on an EU readmission agreement
between the two actors. Integral to the European Union’s security strategy are these readmission
agreements, which solidify the commitment of non-EU states to taking back irregular migrants
who have been designated by the EU as residing without proper authorization37.
This intentional utilization of migration anxiety as political leverage can be seen in a
2019 speech given by King Mohammed VI at the EU-Arab League summit. In this speech, the
King comments on the responsibility of the EU in aiding development to the Arab world. This
call for assistance in development stems from a Moroccan understanding of its ability to garner
aid due to “the EU’s increased tendency to link development aid and trade with migration
cooperation”38. The strategic use of language in this speech suggests that the Moroccan
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government is entirely aware of its ability to use the topic of migration as leverage due to the
dependency of the EU on Morocco’s border control assistance. The limits of the European
Neighborhood Policy in regard to Morocco has also solidified the Moroccan regime’s confidence
in using “its growing leverage on security and migration to demand greater economic
cooperation and knowledge sharing while adopting an increasingly defiant tone towards anything
it sees as political meddling”, most importantly regarding its territorial claims to the Western
Sahara39.
The reversal of opinion by the Spanish government in its opinion on the Western Sahara
conflict suggests that the intention to win concessions on the Sahara conflict is the main
motivation behind the escalation of Ceuta border. Although the escalation of this conflict in the
hope of winning concessions for their position on the Western Sahara reflects heavily the
sentiment that the state is punching above its weight in terms of the relative size and power of its
institutions in comparison to the European Union, the success of the Ceuta Border incident in
solidifying Spanish support for Morocco’s autonomy proposal demonstrates an understanding of
the political leverage that Morocco yields in terms of migration. Since the Moroccan government
has become increasingly aware that the European Union’s concern regarding the influx of
migration in the Western Mediterranean places it in a position to “become increasingly
demanding on the economic front and less willing to concede on the political front”, the regime
has proved that the use of migration as political leverage is entirely advantageous40.

39
40

Ibid., 6
Ibid., 9

McKenna

24

Domestic Political Considerations
The decade preceding the Ceuta Border Incident in Morocco was characterized by the
domestic political stagnancy following the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring proved challenging to
the King’s regime as nationwide protests broke out across Morocco on February 20th, 2011. The
protests were inspired by other movements in the MENA region, with the “youth voicing
requirements for regaining a sense of social and national dignity through slogans expressed in a
universal language: dignity, freedom, justice”41. This political movement, commonly referred to
as the F20 movement, solidified the creation of a reformed Moroccan constitution that intended
to address the calls for overarching reform from the King’s regime. In reforming the constitution,
King Mohammed VI circumvented revolutions like those which occurred in Tunisia and Egypt.
In the years following this movement, disillusionment with the Moroccan government remained
consistent due to the largely cosmetic reforms to the constitution.
Much like the Perejil Crisis, the Ceuta border incident occurred only months before an
important Moroccan election. The general discontent with the lack of tangible change in
Morocco following the F20 movement led to a radical change within the makeup of the
government. While the Islamist Justice and Development Party constituted the majority of
representation within the Moroccan government following the 2011 protests, the 2021 election
proved unsuccessful for the party, with the loss of 90% of the PJD’s seats in the Moroccan
election being attributed to the lack of political change promised following the February 20th
movement42. The results of the election suggest that the Moroccan public’s disillusionment with
the country’s political parties suggests the importance of consolidating domestic support through
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escalating tensions with Spain is insignificant. Much like the Perejil crisis, domestic political
considerations prove subordinate to foreign policy objectives due to the stagnancy of Morocco’s
political atmosphere.
Conclusion
In determining a pattern between the outcomes of the Perejil Crisis and the Ceuta Border
Crisis in the context of the proposed hypotheses, it is evident that the Moroccan government has
ignited diplomatic tensions in order to garner international support for their position on the
Western Sahara. While both cases of diplomatic tension have garnered domestic political support
due to the projection of Moroccan popular nationalism against the perceived colonial holdings of
North African territory by the Spanish government, this nationalism is not essential in ensuring
the Moroccan regime’s survival or approval due to the mostly authoritarian character of its
government. With this in mind I have determined that the Moroccan government has been using
political tension with Spain to pressure the European Union and its members states to reach a
consensus with the United States’ on its recognition of the Western Sahara as Moroccan
territory.
My analysis of the two cases suggest that the motivations behind the escalation of
diplomatic tensions during both the 2002 and 2021 crises vary slightly due to the different
political climates in which the different crises occurred. Whereas the Perejil Island Crisis
occurred in the pre-Arab Spring era and worked to solidify the identity of King Mohammed VI
within the international community, the political atmosphere of the 2021 Ceuta Border Crisis
made the escalation of tensions heavily related to the United States’ recognition of the Western
Sahara in combination with the increased anxiety of Europe over irregular migration. The Perejil
Crisis seemed to be motivated by the new monarch’s desire to prove himself both domestically
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and internationally. Despite dissatisfaction following the stagnancy in the post-Arab Spring era,
there still remains strong support for the monarchy, with the 2021 elections only solidifying the
pro-monarchical stance of the general public. While the Perejil Island Crisis was fruitless in its
attempts to win international concessions regarding its territorial claims over Ceuta and Melilla,
the Ceuta border incident was more successful in its acquisition of concessions regarding the
Western Sahara.
The foreign policy decisions of Morocco as they relate to territorial disputes and the
Western Sahara conflict are inherently linked to the support of the Moroccan monarchy due to
the efficacy of employing nationalism in establishing domestic support for the regime’s decisions
during disputes. The strength of nationalism in Morocco heavily depends on the contentious
historical relationship between Spain and Morocco. Most notably,
“The successive expulsions of ‘Moors’, the occupation of Ceuta and Melilla in the 15th
century, the battle of the Three Kings (1578), the Tetuan War (1860), the Rif War (19231926), the Spanish civil war (1936), the occupation of the North and sub-Saharan Africa
(1912), the independence of Morocco (1956), the Green March (1975), and the incident
of the islet of Leila-Perejil (2003) are all crucial moments which have mobilized and led
to collective passions for both nations”43.
The cultivation of nationalism through the reminiscence on the Moroccan peoples’ historical
relationship with the European power has relied on these incessant issues between Morocco and
Spain. The underlying postcolonial narratives of both the Perejil Crisis and the Ceuta Border
Incident have been successful in fostering nationalist sentiment. While the nationalistic sentiment
serves to further solidify the legitimacy of the King’s regime in the eyes of the Moroccan public,
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the domestic political considerations do not constitute a significant concern of the government or
the monarchy in igniting diplomatic tensions with Spain.
The hypothesis suggesting the primacy of domestic politics is largely inaccurate due to
the stability of the Moroccan regime as a semi-authoritarian government. Having already
circumvented a potentially significant challenge to the monarchy in the February 20th movement,
there is little to suggest that the Moroccan regime is intentionally employing a strategy not unlike
the “rally ‘round the flag” effect of the U.S. to consolidate power. Having successfully curbed
actual democratization in lieu of cosmetic changes to the Moroccan constitution, there is little
advantage in employing tactics like the escalations of Perejil and Ceuta to consolidate domestic
support for the regime.
The success of the Moroccan regime in achieving its political agenda regarding Spanish
opinion on the Western Sahara can be directly attributed to its provocations of diplomatic
tensions with Spain. In determining which of the two motivations is more likely in the escalation
of diplomatic tensions between Morocco and Spain, it is evident that the desire for concessions
regarding the Western Sahara conflict constitutes the stimulus for these provocations. The most
significant and tangible of these concessions is the Spanish commitment to support for the
autonomy proposal of the Western Sahara. This reversal of Spanish opinion following the Ceuta
Border incident signifies a potential new approach towards Morocco’s relationship with the EU:
an approach in which the protection of EU borders remains dependent on the organization’s
commitment to aiding the development of the Moroccan state.
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